541. Therefore the only absolute in existence is a "something that is". But in daily life we do not see this "something" in this, its nameless state, for the simple reason that, as we have seen above, it is inaccessible to sensory perception. Nevertheless, when we do "see" – that is to say, sense or experience this "something" – this "perception" is but an illusion for it can never in any case be anything but the "sight" of this "something" and not this "something" itself. This is confirmed even more strongly by the fact that sight or sensing is merely a reaction to the thing in question.
      That the sight of an object and the object itself are two different things is made clear by the fact that seeing or experiencing must unfailingly be the result of a cause. This cause is the thing itself, while the "sight" of the thing is its effect. We can see even more clearly that the "sight" of something and the thing itself are two different things, through the fact that the thing can well exist without being seen, while the "sight" of the thing cannot possibly come about without the existence of the thing. Besides, the sight of a thing can be multiplied, for just as many sights or experiences of something will arise as there are eyes or senses to see with, without the thing changing or multiplying in the very least or in any way on that account. The thing still remains just the same single thing, quite regardless of how many thousands of times it is seen. So the "sight" of a thing and the thing itself cannot possibly be the same. Therefore, when "something No. 1" "sees itself", this "seeing" and this "something" will also be two things. But as we already know that only "something No. 1" exists, then the "sight" of this "something" must be an illusion. In this way the existence of that illusion is an actual reality. The illusory aspect of this "something that is" must therefore be its aspect as a detailed analysis of "something No. 1". It is this aspect which is so different from what it seems to be. It seems to be real, but is in fact unreal, in that "something No. 1" is superior to any kind of analysis other than a "something that is".