695. As this cause exists behind thought, will and manifestation and is the innermost experiencing "something" in our own existence, this same "causeless cause" is, as we have already mentioned, the same as our own self or I. We have now arrived at the absolute originator of our own life. But we have also seen that this I is in reality by its very nature totally beyond any analysis other than that it constitutes the most profound cause of its own declaration of its existence or presence in the universe. Without this declaration it would be completely outside experience or manifestation and would therefore have to be "nothing". But it is now an indisputable fact that it cannot exist in this way. It can exist only as the cause of manifestation and experience. But since it is the cause of manifestation and experience, it is in itself outside these two realities. It cannot therefore in itself constitute any kind of manifestation or experience whatsoever. Consequently, unlike the manifestations or created things, it cannot be expressed in terms of useful effect, since it has in itself nothing whatsoever to do with effect. It is completely beyond answers in terms of weights and measures. But a thing that has no weight, volume, colour or measurement, but that nevertheless exists, can therefore have only one analysis: "something that is". The fact that, apart from this analysis, it is in its innermost being nameless is due not to a faulty sensory apparatus on the part of the researcher, but on the contrary to an analysis based on this same observer's absolutely highest, all-penetrating sensory clarity. If this faculty of observation were not so all-penetrating, this "something" would continue to appear shrouded in a mass of ignorance's overly fanciful veils of mists or ascribed characteristics, expressed in terms of weights, measures and volume, that is, characteristics that constitute absolutely exclusively things that have been produced, which in turn, as we have already seen, are subject to thought and will and are thereby established as subordinate characteristics of the I, and cannot therefore be the analysis of the I itself.
      As the absolute analysis of the I can be only that it constitutes a "something that is" and it is consequently by its very nature nameless, we have, as the readers already know, expressed it in "Livets Bog" as "X1".