787. So how can we know that there exists such an area at all or anything other than just "movement"?
      We can know for the simple reason that "movement" can never exist or occur independently. It will, as the analyses in "Livets Bog" demonstrate, always be a link in some sort of planned creation, thereby revealing itself as an expression of "desire" or "will", and it thereby shows itself to be identical to "thought", and will in fact eventually be experienced as "intellectuality" and "love". "Movement" therefore reveals the fact that there is "something" that can be "intellectual" and "loving". But who is this "something"? Is it conceivable that the "movement" has in itself the ability to experience absolutely any other kind of "movement"? Is it conceivable that the flywheel of a steam engine can by itself want to run faster or slower? Is it conceivable that the speed of a train "wishes" by itself to stop at this or that station? Is it not rather the thought and will and thereby the consciousness of the driver of the train that directly decides the speed of the train as it rushes along? And is this not the case in all situations in which "movement" features? Is not "movement" precisely something that always has to be guided, controlled and formed by the will, thereby becoming an expression of thought and desire, that is to say, an "expression of life"? What are "catastrophes" other than "types of movement" that elude being controlled by the will and thought of the originator of the area of the catastrophe, and therefore collide with other "types of movement", creating disintegration, shattering and splintering? The reason why the use of bombs, torpedoes or other kinds of destructive and devastating phenomena are to such a great extent "catastrophes" for the forms of living beings that they affect is due entirely to the fact that in this situation they constitute a sudden assault of "types of movement" and thereby energies and forces that are quite beyond the protective control and command of the rightful originator of the area. They consequently do not fulfil the laws that are an exclusive condition for the normal well-being of that area. If the originator in question were able to use its thought and will in one way or another to counteract the kinds of energy and to bind and thereby neutralise the catastrophic foreign "types of movement", no catastrophe could befall this originator. But then the whole phenomenon could easily become a catastrophe for the originator of the foreign energies, since the situation would then mean that the catastrophe that was aimed at its victim had failed. And the advantages that the catastrophe should have brought home to itself would fail to come about. We can then see that the same holds true for both parties in that whenever their calculations and thereby the control of their will are inadequate, the "catastrophe" comes about. Does not the same thing apply in the case of so-called "natural catastrophes"? What is an earthquake, a volcanic eruption, a flood or the like other than forms of energy or "forms of movement" that have broken free from the control of the Earth's I's consciousness or the automatic functions that govern its health, and that thereby become a "catastrophe" for its own microbeings, that is to say plants, animals and human beings, becoming a kind of temporary abnormality or illness totally analogous to human and animal illnesses? Are not these also abnormal phenomena, organic types of energy or "types of movement" that have temporarily broken free from their normal automatic functions, thereby bringing about "natural catastrophes" for these beings' microbeings in the relevant bodily areas or regions?
      As we have seen, there is no shortage of realities that prove the fact that it is impossible for types of energy or "types of movement" to occur in an uncontrolled way without creating a "catastrophe". But since it is the case that they do not always produce a "catastrophe" but also appear to be "under the control of the will" and thereby appear as "planned" phenomena, they clearly reveal a "will-exercising something". And this "will-exercising something" differs from "movement" in that it is independent and is able to control the "movement", and is thereby the master of the "movement". But, as we have seen over and over again, this "something" cannot in itself have any other analysis than that it is "something that is", since whatever we might find to say will always express only one or another "type of movement" that is "willed" or "controlled" by this "something". The analysis cannot therefore possibly be an analysis of the "will-exercising something" itself, but of what it wills. In other words, it is only an analysis of "will", not of the "will's" true originator. And in order to emphasise that this "will-exercising something" therefore exists outside "movement" and thereby outside all analysis, we have defined its nameless state as "X1".