951. From this "auditorium" or "day-consciousness" the I is an observer of its own fate while at the same time being an active performer on that very stage. It therefore makes an active contribution to the play itself. And this enables us to witness the elevated, divine nature of the I as the "fixed point" around which the manifestations of the individual or the living being move or vibrate. We can see here that it is impossible for the I to be bound to one place. It cannot be located here or there. It is in the "auditorium" at the same time as it is playing a role on stage, as well as, through its talent kernels, being a "technician" or "stagehand" behind the scenes. But if it is both here and there at the same time, it must be "everywhere". So, what we are in fact witnessing here is a kind of "omnipresence". But is it not precisely this quality that we were told as children that God possesses?
      But can a "thing" really be "omnipresent"? No, in the absolute sense, it cannot. A "thing" is in every way "bound to a certain place". It is bound to time and has an "age", which is an indication of its "placement" in time. It has dimensions and weight, which mark its place in volume and size. It represents degrees of speed, which mark its place in "movement". Every single thing is thus absolutely "bound to a certain place". That it is nevertheless a fact in our day-consciousness and in our own experience of life that we are at one and the same time both a passive member of the audience and an active performer, it also becomes clear that there is "'something" that is different from a "thing".
      A "thing", in other words something that is produced, cannot be in more than one place at a time. A thing cannot be in Europe and America at the same time. A locomotive cannot simultaneously pull a train in Australia and in Africa, just as a thing cannot be passive at the same time as being active. It cannot at the same time be moving and at rest. But through our experience of life, indeed, entirely within our own consciousness, we can witness that there is "something" that is at one and the same time both passive and active, "something" that is a "member of the audience" and at the same time an "actor". But it is precisely this phenomenon or this view that proves that what we sense or see is in reality illusions, since of course a thing cannot be at rest and at the same time in movement, just as a thing cannot be in two or more places at the same time. What we are seeing cannot therefore be absolute reality, it can be only "scenery", "disguise" or "camouflage". So, what is it that is camouflaged? To find the answer we will have to take a close look at the experience of life. What is the central point in it? Is it not the sense or view of our own appearance as a living, functioning organism and then our fellow beings' appearance as living organisms? What we are seeing or sensing is thus not the I but the organism, regardless of whether it is ourselves or our fellow beings we are directing our senses towards. But is not the organism and the I one and the same thing? No, it cannot possibly be, for the very experience of life unwaveringly reveals that it consists of two diametrically opposing principles, namely "something" that is "bound to a certain place" and "something" that is "omnipresent" or "free". We have just seen how in our experience of life we sense ourselves as being a "performer" and a "member of the audience", "passive" and "active", in short, "bound to a certain place" and at the same time "free". As this is the basic analysis of the experience of life – it would not exist at all if we removed one or other of these two sensations – the sensation of being "free" and the sensation of being "bound to a certain place" emerge as incontestable facts of equal importance. And we will call them "life substance no. 37 and no. 38" respectively.