1078. But then what about the terrestrial human being's morality? It consists, as will be remembered, exclusively of "temporal things". Is this being "evil" after all? Can this being in spite of everything be "unjust" and be itself subject to "injustice"? If this is the case how can it then be true that "everything is very good"? Indeed, in order to be clearly orientated about this we must dwell a little on the perspective nature of the range of sensory perception. Through the material already covered in "Livets Bog" we have already gained such insight into the mystery of sensory experience that we know that everything is dependent on the eye that sees, which in other words means that all sensory perception depends on the "principle of perspective". Every sensation or experience is thus a perspective relationship, this relationship in turn making all experiences "relative". Since all sensory perception can be identical only with "time" itself, and "time" in turn can be experienced or exist only as an eternally changing "now", this "now" cannot exist without being coloured by this "change". Indeed, this "now" can be divided up according to the various "changes". Since it thus changes eternally, there is for the first time the possibility of the concept of "difference" or the fact that something can be "different". Since the character that the "now" displays at the moment of experience is , because of the "change", merely "temporary" and must therefore be replaced by another, which at the next moment will colour or control the "now", there is the "now" that dominates at the moment, and the "now" that is approaching, just as there is also the "now" that previously dominated or existed, and which has been replaced by the current "now". We already know these three forms of "now" as the "present", the "future" and the "past" respectively. And we have here before us the first form of experience of "space". Indeed, it is the primordial experience itself. Since in the "now" there thus exists "something that is" in the moment (the present), "something that was" (the past), and "something that will be" (the future), the "now" appears in three sections. But a section must have "place", which in turn is the same as "space". The "now" thus appears as three forms of "space", which in turn indicate their positions around the I, these positions giving us the first indication of the I's "range of sensory perception" and thereby the indication of this I as a "living being".