1082. Since sensory perception itself is determined exclusively by the fact that the things or details within the range of sensory perception are different, this difference between things becomes just as absolute a reality as sensory perception itself. If we therefore say, for example, that a being is "unjust", it really means that we are expressing the "limitation" or the contrast formed by this specific action or phenomenon within the range of sensory perception, this being a characteristic that this phenomenon absolutely must have, since it otherwise could not possibly be sensed. It contrasts thus with the details in our range of sensory perception that we perceived as "just". If it did not contrast with these, we would have perceived it as being at one with these details, and it would thereby have been classed along with what we perceive as "just". The same is naturally the case when we say that something is "loving", something is "big", something is "small", something is "ingenious" or "primitive" and so on. Each of these expressions registers the particular contrast exhibited by each of the above-mentioned phenomena with which it defines or characterises itself in relation to the other phenomena or details in the range of sensory perception. When it is therefore a question of sensory perception, one cannot ignore these details or claim that they are "illusions" within the very sphere of experience, the "now" or "time". Every single one is an absolute reality without which sensory perception would be impossible. When one human being perceives another as "evil", this view is a true reality in the being's range of sensory perception. This in turn means that in this range all the details have a relationship to one another such that their general effect or overall result is that the nature of the foreign being simply must seem "evil" in relation to this. But this does not mean that the being in question in the absolute sense really is "evil". The fact is that there can be other sets of senses or ranges of sensory perception within which the being in question seems to be the opposite. This means, therefore, that the details of these other beings' ranges of sensory perception have a general appearance that forms a greater or lesser contrast to the appearance of the above-mentioned being, thus inevitably resulting in this being's general effect seeming "good" in relation to the first-mentioned general effect. It is the same with all sensory perception. What seems to be "good" for one being may at the same time seem to be "evil" for another; what is "beautiful" for one being may be "ugly" for another, and so on in any number of fields. But then who is right? Absolutely everyone is right. Things are really "evil", "good", "beautiful" and "ugly" in the ranges of sensory perception in which they are felt or sensed as such. How could it be otherwise? If it were not so what could sustain sensory perception? The faculty to evaluate, and thereby the evaluation of that which is sensed or experienced, depends exclusively on the contrast or relation of that which is sensed or experienced to the details already existing in the same range of sensory perception. It is precisely the same principle that holds true if, for example, after having put one's hand in water that has a temperature of 5 degrees, one puts it into water that has a temperature of 15 degrees. One will then feel that this water is "warm". If, however, one first puts one's hand in water that has a temperature of 30 degrees, one can but feel that the water that has a temperature of 15 degrees is "cold". Since all sensation thus depends exclusively on the contrast or deviation that what is sensed constitutes in relation to the particular nature of the experiences already existing in the range of sensory perception, a being cannot possibly sense or experience in any other way whatsoever than that allowed or determined by its previous experiences and their position in the centre or periphery of the range of sensory perception. The feeling of "coldness" or "warmth" are true realities in the given "moment" or "now" in which they are experienced. That two people at the same "moment" or in the same "now" do not feel the 15 degrees as the same thing does not thus change the principle. Whether they feel one temperature or another as "warmth" or "coldness" will thus depend on what feeling of heat they have experienced immediately before. The same also holds true of the experience of "time". If one is waiting for something that one is longing for intensely, this waiting time can seem "long", while the same waiting time can feel "short" if one is in a situation where one feels very comfortable and is therefore very reluctant to have this situation come to an end. In the first case the minutes can feel almost like hours, while the hours in the latter case can be felt as almost nothing but minutes. Both feelings of the speed or course of time are thus absolutely equally true within the ranges of sensory perception of the beings in question. If the opposite were the case, which of the two beings' feelings would then be the true one?
      Indeed, here one will perhaps claim that they are both wrong, and that in this case the concepts of "cold" and "warm" or "long" and "short" are "illusions" and have nothing to do with reality. But it is precisely this view of things that is an "illusion", since it is namely a lie. On the contrary, these sensations do have to do with reality, since they are "reality" itself within the range of sensory perception in which they have each arisen and exist. To deny this is to deny all existing experiences that occur within the beings' ranges of sensory perception, which in turn is the same as to deny the existence of life itself. The experience of life consists solely of sensations or the perspective relationships between the various experiences in the range of sensory perception. What other reality could be realistic for a being other than its own feeling? Could one's "neighbour's" feeling be a greater reality in the former being's range of sensory perception? No, only the being's own experience can be "concrete". Another being's experience cannot possibly be anything but "abstract" in a foreign being's range of sensory perception. The universe or life is for a being exactly as it senses it. How could it be otherwise? What the being does not sense or experience cannot of course have a perspective position in its range of sensory perception, and will, indeed, be totally absent. A being's sensory perception of the universe will be merely its collected feeling of the perspective position of the various details of the universe experienced within its range of sensory perception. This collective feeling of the universe or the being's "world picture" (world view) can thus be characterised only by the experiences it has had and the perspective position the individual experiences have attained either in the periphery of its range of sensory perception or near its centre.