Martinus: Livets Bog, vol. 4, sect. 1083

1083. But since the central place itself cannot be occupied by any other being, but is the eternal, unshakeable "private property" of the individual, the perspective cannot possibly be quite the same for every living being. The central area is the actual "viewpoint" of the individual. And since "perspective" is the same as things seen from the above-mentioned point, every being's range of sensory perception and thereby its sensory perception of the universe or of everything else is individual. It is thus a matter of course that what one individual senses and experiences of the universe with its beings and things must therefore look correspondingly different to another being and can be only "abstract" for this being. For it to be absolutely "concrete" this latter being must become completely identical with the former being's "viewpoint", "central area" or I, which is totally impossible. For if it were possible the one being would have to wipe out the other entirely or, in other words, turn "something that is" into "nothing", which is in turn just as impossible as producing "something" from "nothing". Every "living being" has thus its own specific range of sensory perception in which life or details are sensed in a way that is specific and individual to the being. The being can describe or give an account of this range of sensory perception to another being, but this description or account can never be anything other than an "abstract" phenomenon. No other being's range of sensory perception can become a realistic reality, which in turn means a "personal experience", for any being other than itself.