1692. Since matter here is thus not the domicile of wakingly day-conscious I's, sensing life through this matter is to a great extent latent. Pain or suffering cannot thus be felt by means of this matter. Those parts of the wakingly day-conscious organism within which mineral matter has its domain are intrinsically "insentient". We can therefore cut our nails and hair without feeling pain, just as our teeth are insentient. What we call "toothache" is not a pain in the tooth itself, but a pain in the combination of nerves connected to the tooth and the musculature of the tooth. In the tooth itself, and incidentally in every kind of mineral matter, no wakingly day-conscious feeling exists. But since insentience is the same as unconsciousness, mineral matter is thus a kind of "unconscious" matter. From this we have the term "lifelessness". It differs thereby from the other substances – the "vegetable" and "animal" substances – which have long since been universally known to be expressions of life. Even though vegetable matter cannot to any great extent be said to be expressive of life or consciousness, it cannot, however, be said to be "unconscious". It is imbued with so much consciousness that the I is able to have an "inkling" of pleasantness and unpleasantness through it. And with regard to animal matter, the I, as will be remembered, is able to experience pain and suffering, as well as well-being and a zest for living, as direct, wakingly day-conscious realities or facts. What determines the appearance of this substance as an expression of "consciousness" and "unconsciousness", as "living" and as "lifeless"? Indeed, is it not revealed in the very words themselves? A substance that is "living" must of course be imbued or pervaded by "life", while a substance that is "unconscious" or "lifeless" must be a substance that is not pervaded by "consciousness" or "life". Since consciousness or life are the same as thoughts, will, knowledge and feeling, and this in turn is the same as "spirit", a "lifeless" or "unconscious" substance will constitute a substance in which there is no "spirit". In order that a substance can manifest itself as something "living" it has thus to be pervaded by "spirit", which, as previously mentioned, means pervaded by thoughts, will, knowledge and feeling. But a substance that is thus supposed to constitute thoughts, will, knowledge and feeling cannot be an ordinary collection of chemicals or mass of substances, just as it cannot either consist of a mere collection of power units or centres of energy. But if this is the case, there is only one possible way in which "living" matter can exist, namely by it being made up of a collection or group of "living beings".